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SOURCES OF RIGHTS TO ACCESS PUBLIC INFORMATION*
Henry H. Perritt, Jr."
I. INTRODUCTION
Public information is valuable, both economically and as a raw material
of democratic government. Public and private sector publishers long have
earned a return by selling public information.' The prospect of selling some
public information and a reluctance to have other public information widely
known tempts governments and their contractors to restrict access.
The temptations are the same at the federal, state, and municipal levels
of both the United States and European governments,2 though the legal
frameworks may differ. This Article analyzes the legal issues involved when
government entities want to restrict access to their information, either to
prevent embarrassment or to keep others from undercutting their revenue
expectations from the sale of public information. The Article mobilizes the
legal arguments entitling members of the public, including publishers, to
access and emphasizes the clash of interests when a government seeks to
sponsor a monopoly for access to information in electronic formats. It is in
this conflict of interests that new revenue-seeking temptations present the
strongest threat to access.
This Article confronts the central tension between the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act (FOIA)3 and similar state public records laws on the one hand,
and intellectual property law on the other. FOIA and similar state laws4
* This Article was presented at "Access Versus Privacy: Approaches to State
Information Policy," a conference held on March 17, 1995 at the Marshall-Wythe
School of Law, College of William & Mary, sponsored by the William & Mary Bill of
Rights Journal and the Virginia Council on Information Management.
.. Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. Member of the bar, Vir-
ginia, Pennsylvania, District of Columbia, Maryland, and United States Supreme Court.
The author appreciates research assistance from his law clerks, Timothy McDonough,
Class of 1995, Thomas Thistle, Class of 1996, Villanova University School of Law, and
proofing assistance from Susan Rexford Coady.
' A number of colonial printers, including Benjamin Franklin, got their start by
contracting to print the laws of provincial assemblies. JOHN WILLIAM DRAPER, LIFE OF
FRANKLIN 14-15 (Library of Congress reprint 1977).
2 See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Commercialization of Government Information: Compar-
isons Between the European Community and the United States, 4 INTERNET RESEARCH
7 (1994).
3 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
' Terminology differs from state to state. For convenience, this Article refers to the
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make it difficult to set up state-sanctioned monopolies for the sale of public
information. Conversely, intellectual property protection makes it easier to
set up state-sanctioned monopolies. Even though literal interpretation of
some freedom of information statutes and the Copyright Act seem to permit
state-sanctioned monopolies, below the federal level the First Amendment
and the Patents and Copyrights Clause of the United States Constitution
impose significant restrictions on government efforts to block access and
redissemination of public information. In addition to limitations on intellec-
tual property law, antitrust law enters into the legal equation when govern-
ment seeks not to withhold information altogether, but to sponsor a private
monopoly over public information.
In order to provide an appropriate technological and economic context
for the legal analysis to follow, this Article begins by explaining the tech-
nology for electronic dissemination of public information. It then reviews
some microeconomic principles to facilitate evaluation of the various tech-
nological approaches.
II. TECHNOLOGIES FOR PUBLISHING PUBLIC INFORMATION
Publications containing public information have distinct attributes of
value for users. At the core is raw content. This is the basic message or
data, with nothing added to help users find, retrieve, keep, or browse for
particular pieces of information.5 Virtually all information products have
something added to the raw content. Most products have at least some
"chunking" and "tagging" value added. In the print technologies, chunking
and tagging value comprises page breaks, running headers and footers, head-
lines, and subtitles. With digital computer technologies, chunking and tag-
ging value includes things like record and file boundaries, paragraph breaks,
and computer readable tags that can be accessed from elsewhere. In addi-
tion, more sophisticated products have "pointers," which either point to
other parts of the same document, as in a table of contents, index, or cross
reference;6 or point to a different document, as in a conventional footnote
reference, or a Hyper Text Markup Language (HTML)7 reference to another
resource on the Internet in the World Wide Web.' Beyond that are the less
federal statute as FOIA and to similar state statutes as "freedom of information stat-
utes."
' An example would be an ASCII file (a raw text file readable by a desktop com-
puter word processing program) of a statute.
6 These internal references are known as internal pointers.
"HTML" is a set of computer processable codes that allow text and graphical
information to be published and retrieved electronically through the World Wide Web
on Internet.
' Pointers that refer to other documents are known as external pointers.
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tangible kinds of value-added features, like extra copies,9 availability at
other locations," integrity assurance, billing and collection value," and
promotional capabilities.'
With print publishing technologies, the publisher bundles most of these
attributes of value and the consumer buys the entire bundle from that pub-
lisher. Digital computer technologies, particularly as they are implemented
in distributed and open systems like the Internet, permit unbundling of the
attributes of value so that one supplier may supply only raw content, and
another may make available one or more other value-added attributes such
as pointers that the user combines with the raw content on demand. 3 Still
other suppliers might make available billing and collection value 4 or pro-
motion value.
This facilitation for unbundling the value-added elements in publishing
drastically changes the economics of publishing. In fact, it has already con-
tributed to a more competitive marketplace with lower barriers to entry.
With Internet technology, a would-be publisher needs only the capital to
establish a server that adds a particular type of value, and not the capacity
to own 'the content and other types of value, or to provide a full range of
subject matter. The Internet thus provides demand economies of scope. 5 A
The benefit of having extra copies is known as duplication value.
10 This benefit is known as distribution value.
Billing and collection value might seem to shift points of view because it seems
more valuable to the seller than to the purchaser. On the other hand, billing and collec-
tion value makes it easier for the purchaser to buy something on the spot and therefore
can be viewed as a form of value to the purchaser as well as the seller.
12 Marketing represents promotion value. The array of value-added elements is de-
veloped more fully in Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Unbundling Value in Electronic Information
Products: Intellectual Property Protection for Machine Readable Interfaces, 20
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 415 (1994).
" For example, a page on a World Wide Web server or a cluster of Gopher menu
items exemplify forms of pure pointers value. World Wide Web and Gopher are appli-
cations for information organization and retrieval on the Internet.
14 Marvin A. Sirbu and other researchers at Camegie Mellon University have pro-
posed a billing and collection server that would use public key encryption to facilitate
charging for resources obtained through the Internet. See Marvin A. Sirbu, Internet Bill-
ing Service Design and Prototype Implementation, 1 J. INTERACTIVE MULTIMEDIA
Ass'N INTELL. PROP. PROJECT 67 (1994).
'5 Economies of scope exist when the per unit cost is lowered due to a greater vari-
ety of unit types available from the same supplier. Demand economies of scope exist
when the purchaser experiences an economies of scope situation. In other words, in
traditional publishing, demand economies of scope exist for a bookstore because a user
faces a lower per unit transaction cost by buying from a bookstore that has a wide
variety of materials instead of having to go to one bookstore for The New York Times,
another for The Washington Post, and another for Newsweek Magazine. See FREDERICK
M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE 100-02 (3d ed. 1990) (explaining economies of scope). See generally David
1995]
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good example of the attractiveness of Internet technology is the "Thomas"
system established by the Library of Congress to make congressional mate-
rials available in full text.16 Thomas uses a World Wide Web technology
on the Internet," was established in a matter of weeks, and is free, con-
trasted with the more limited service of the Government Printing Office
which uses mostly dial up access, and was established over a period of
several years."
The increased likelihood of unbundling the value-added attributes in
electronic publishing has particular implications for the publishing of public
information. Public information is special in that its raw content is generally
considered to be non-proprietary because it is owned by governmental enti-
ties which either created 'it or collected it under legal mandates, whereas
most other attributes of value are usually added by private publishers who
own intellectual property rights in at least some of the value-added fea-
tures.' Under more traditional technologies in which the value-added fea-
tures were bundled with and made practically inseparable from the content
to which they were attached, the publisher gained de facto intellectual prop-
erty protection for the entire bundle, including the content.2 ° Under more
recent Internet and Internet-like technologies,2 the content can remain easi-
J. Teece, Economies of Scope and the Scope of the Enterprise, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 233 (1980) (stating that enterprise scope is determined by transaction costs and
realization of economies associated with the simultaneous supply of inputs common to
processes for producing distinct outputs); David J. Teece, Towards an Economic Theory
of the Multiproduct Firm, 3 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39 (1982) (exploring economies
of scope for different inputs).
16 Thomas is reachable through the World Wide Web at http://thomas.loc.gov/.
See generally Gingrich Inaugurates Thomas: Republicans to Rethink Access to
Government Info, ELECTRONIC PUB. INFO. NEWSL., Jan. 13, 1995, at 1-3 (describing the
Thomas system as running on a Unix platform operating through a TI connection (a
dedicated telephone line) to the Internet); Robert Thomason, CyberSurfing-A New Win-
dow on Congress, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1995, at C7.
18 See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Public Information in the National Information Infra-
structure: Report to the Regulatory Information Service Center, General Services Ad-
ministration, and to the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Af-
fairs, Office of Management and Budget § 2.1.2 (May 20, 1994) (on file with author).
'9 See infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text. Content generated by the federal
government is ineligible for copyright. Value-added enhancements generated by private
sector entities are entitled to copyright protection.
20 The Supreme Court's decision in Feist v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S.
340 (1991) (holding that the research involved in assembling factual informa-
tion--"sweat of the brow"-is not protected by copyright), is not at odds with this
premise. The point is not that the raw content is necessarily protected by intellectual
property (that proposition is explored much more thoroughly in other parts of this Arti-
cle), but rather that the protection of value added attributes extends to the content be-
cause it is more difficult to separate the value added attributes from the content.
2 The key features of the Internet in this respect are its non-proprietary standards
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ly accessible to end users and intermediaries alike, while the value-added
contributions of entrepreneurs is protected appropriately.
III. INFORMATION POLICY PRINCIPLES
To realize the improvements in public access and in the use of public
information which technology makes possible, federal, state, and local gov-
ernments must adopt and implement two key policy precepts. First, they
must make electronic formats available when they exist. Second, they must
allow for, and promote, a diversity of channels and sources of public infor-
mation.22
The first principle, that electronic formats should be made available, is
consistent with a policy statement adopted by the American Bar Association
in 1990,23 recommendations adopted by the Administrative Conference of
the United States (ACUS),24 policies adopted by the President's Office of
Management and Budget,25 and legislation passed by the Senate in 19946
which is expected to be reintroduced in the 104th Congress in 1995. To
deny public access to electronic formats, as the legislature of New Jersey
has done,27 denies the public the benefits of publically funded public record
for packet communication and connections, and its common name and address space.
These features make possible a worldwide distributed information system, functioning
as an electronic marketplace, production line, and town hall.
22 See generally Perritt, supra note 18 (commissioned, but not necessarily endorsed,
by the recipients).
23 ABA Recommendation No. 102 (adopted August, 1990) (guidelines for applying
Freedom of Information Act to electronic formats); ABA Recommendation No. 109C
(adopted August 12-13, 1991) (guidelines for federal and state agency dissemination of
public information in electronic form). Both ABA recommendations are available in full
text for viewing or downloading from the World Wide Web at
http://www.law.vill.edu/Aba/adminlaw.html.
24 1 C.F.R. § 305.88-10 (1993); see Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Electronic Acquisition and
Release of Federal Agency Information: An Analysis of ACUS Recommendations, 41
ADMIN. L. REv. 253 (1989) (explanation of Recommendation 88-10 by its principal
author); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Federal Electronic Information Policy, 63 TEMP. L.Q. 201
(1990) [hereinafter Perritt, Federal Electronic Information Policy] (elaboration of Free-
dom of Information Act concepts developed in Recommendation 88-10).
25 58 Fed. Reg. 36,068 (1993). OMB also released draft guidelines for applying
FOIA to electronic formats in late 1994 available through the Internet at http://www.
law.vill edu/adminlaw.htmI or ftp://ftp.law. vill.edu/pub/law/ABA/ombguide.doc or ftp:l
ftp.law. vill. edu/pub/law/ABA/ombguide.asc.
26 140 CONG. REC. S1046-02 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1994).
27 Act of Nov. 7, 1994, ch. 140, 1994 N.J. Laws § 8. "The right of the citizens of
this state to inspect and copy public records pursuant to Pub. L. 1963, c. 73 ... shall,
with respect to the copying of records maintained by a system of data processing or
image processing, be deemed to refer to the right to receive printed copies of such
records." Id.
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formats and significantly impairs public accessibility to public information
by increasing the cost of search and retrieval. Indeed, the impairment is so
great that the denial of access makes some records practically unavailable.
The policy advocating a diversity of sources and channels of informa-
tion, endorsed by the ABA, the Administrative Conference,29 and the
OMB, 0 is based on the reality that no one supplier can design modem in-
formation products to suit the needs of all users.3' Instead, market forces
and entrepreneurial energy are crucial for learning user needs, and for exper-
imenting in the marketplace with different distribution and marketing tech-
niques and different value-added features in order to satisfy those needs. In
addition, maintaining a diversity of channels and sources protects against
censorship and manipulation of public information for political purposes. In
this respect the diversity policy principle is central to the policy of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution and similar policies embraced
by state constitutions. The diversity principle is inimical to any state-main-
tained or state granted monopoly over public information.32
Of course, many public managers perceive a competing policy interest:
the need to find new sources of financing for public activities.33 For them,
the best way to raise money for new electronic information systems and
public access features is to ensure a sufficient revenue stream from the
information access. One obvious way to do that is, in effect, to sell a fran-
chise to the dissemination activity. Strategies for public finance that depend
on selling franchises to perform public functions are not new. One of the
main ways that King Charles I of Britain financed his government without
seeking parliamentary approval of taxes was through franchises.34 Some of
the revolutionary fervor for both the English revolution and, more than a
century later, the American revolution came from the reaction to perceived
corruption associated with the granting of franchises.35 Franchises are cur-
28 ABA Recommendation No. 109C, supra note 23 (guidelines for federal and state
agency dissemination of public information in electronic form).
29 See supra note 24.
30 See supra note 25.
31 See Perritt, Federal Electronic Information Policy, supra note 24, at 240 (explain-
ing why government suppliers are inadequate as sole or primary sources for public
information).
32 See HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, ELECTRONIC COLLECTION AND
DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION BY FEDERAL AGENCIES: A POLICY OVERVIEW, H.R.
REP. NO. 560, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986) (criticizing the exclusive arrangements that
prevent access to government information in electronic form).
" In addition, some governmental personnel oppose public access for fear of
embarrassing criticism.
14 PAULINE GREGG, KING CHARLES I, at 215 (1981). King Charles's granting of
monopoly rights in production, sale, or management in return for a fee or rent became a
scandal and led to the Monopoly's Act of 1624 in King James's reign, which allowed
many exceptions that King Charles exploited in "an amazing series of projects." Id.
" See generally T.H. BREEN, TOBACCO CULTURE: THE MENTALITY OF THE GREAT
[Vol. 4:1
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rently disfavored because they deprive the public of the benefits of competi-
tion,36 although the temptation to set up monopolies continues in the back-
ground of public-finance discourse.
Before the Civil War, the American distaste for monopolies extended in
some quarters to opposition to the granting of corporate charters and corpo-
rations in general.37 Early colonial and state charters in the United States
expressed an aversion to state granted monopolies.38 There were, however,
others who argued that monopolies may be useful ways to attain public
benefits.39 In fact, however, reluctance to raise taxes to pay for public ac-
tivities led many early state legislatures to revert to the custom of granting
monopolies to private persons to perform public activities.' To be sure,
monopolies have a role. Otherwise, there would be no justification for gov-
ernment activities in any area; everything would be privatized. The issue is
whether a competitive system, or one that allows monopolies, better serves
the public interest.
TIDE WATER PLANTERS ON THE EVE OF REVOLUTION 86-203 (1985) (reviewing notices
from the likes of Patrick Henry and George Washington, which called for the planter
class in Southern colonies to reduce their need for luxuries, and at the same time ex-
pressing the belief that merchant culture in England was corrupt). The reaction to exclu-
sive franchises in England preceding the execution of King Charles and the establish-
ment of Cromwell's commonwealth was not so much based on a perception of corrup-
tion as it was on the exclusion of Parliament from public finance decisions. Id. at 9-13
(explaining how American colonists subscribed to the English "Country" rhetoric, which
denounced corruption and the danger that royal interests would subvert Parliament,
among other things, by granting monopolies and other patronage).
36 This idea originated in terms of political economics with Adam Smith. See ADAM
SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 703, 712-16 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937) (5th ed.
1789) (describing the South Sea Company as an example of the type of parliamentary
sponsored monopoly that should be replaced by an independent free enterprise). But see
Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV.
305, 310-11 (1992); Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of
Author Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 1, 12 n.40 (1992) (characterizing Adam Smith as critical of monopoly
privileges but in favor of temporary monopolies granted to authors and their assigns
under the Statute of Anne as an efficient means of stimulating book production).
" See Note, Incorporating the Republic: The Corporation in Ante-Bellum Political
Culture, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1883, 1893 (1989) (characterizing the debate between the
whigs and the democrats over the nature of corporate charters).
38 GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 188 (1991)
(citing the New Hampshire Constitution).
" Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation and American Legal Thought, 76
GEO. L.J. 1593, 1608 (1988) (summarizing the views of Daniel Raymond, America's
first political economist who pushed for a relaxation of Adam Smith's universal antipa-
thy for monopolies).
' WOOD, supra note 38, at 318.
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IV. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC ACCESS TO PUBLIC
INFORMATION
The two most important bodies of law with respect to public information
policy are those under the Freedom of Information Act4' and similar state
statutes, and intellectual property law.
A. Freedom of Information Acts
1. The Federal Freedom of Information Act
The freedom of information acts grant a right to obtain and copy records
held by governmental entities. The federal Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) extends to virtually all records held by federal agencies outside the
judicial and legislative branches of government, including electronic for-
mats.4 FOIA is interpreted broadly, and its exemptions narrowly.43 The
purpose for which one requests an agency record under FOIA is irrele-
vant." Thus, FOIA is an instrument of the diversity principle. It undercuts
efforts to establish information monopolies because it grants private sector
re-disseminators an entitlement to public information notwithstanding agency
efforts to block access in order to support exclusive distribution arrange-
ments.
The main issues with respect to construction and application of FOIA
involve the relationship of private intellectual property in value-added en-
hancements to public information and the possibility that electronic formats
created from paper agency records, which are never under the control of the
agency, might be outside FOIA's definition of "agency record.' '45 Both of
these issues are present in Tax Analysts v. United States Department of
41 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
42 See infra notes 45-69 and accompanying text.
13 See John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 151-52 (1989) (reiterat-
ing this basic principle but finding that records requested by defense contractor were
properly withheld under law enforcement exemption); United States Dep't of Justice v.
Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 142 n.3 (1989) (holding that burden is on agency to show
that requested records were not within FOIA); Assembly of Cal. v. United States Dep't
of Commerce, 968 F.2d 916, 920 (9th Cir. 1992) (reiterating pro-disclosure policy of
FOIA and affirming order that Commerce Department disclose computer tapes contain-
ing census figures).
" United States Dep't of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 114 S. Ct. 1006,
1013 (1994) (any member of the public has as much interest as any other in FOIA
disclosure; unless privilege is claimed, identity of requesting party is irrelevant.).
4' Long v. Internal Revenue Service, 596 F.2d 362, 364 (9th Cir. 1979) (reversing
district court determination that computer tapes were not FOLA records).
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Justice,4 presently pending in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia. In Tax Analysts, a non-profit publisher of public informa-
tion, seeks access to JURIS, a comprehensive database of federal judicial
opinions, statutes, and agency materials compiled partially by public agen-
cies and partially by West Publishing Company.47 The Justice Department
asserts that those aspects of the JURIS database that are subject to claims of
intellectual property by West Publishing Company do not constitute agency
records or, alternatively, that they are privileged from disclosure by
FOIA.4' The JURIS controversy raises a number of issues of more general
importance. One obvious issue is whether FOIA permits an agency to de-
cline release of electronic formats in its possession on the grounds that the
information contains copyrighted works or on the grounds that the infor-
mation was made available to the government under license restrictions that
prevent its release under FOIA.
Important to the JURIS issue is the analytical framework established by
the Supreme Court of the United States in its review of Department of Jus-
tice v. Tax Analysts.49 That case involved a 1979 FOIA request by Tax
Analysts for district court tax opinions and final orders received by the tax
division of the Department of Justice.5° Tax Analysts wanted those materi-
als to facilitate its publication of paper and electronic databases containing
judicial opinions.5 It could have obtained the opinions from the clerks of
the nearly one hundred district courts around the country, but found that
method of acquisition unsatisfactory.52 The district court upheld the Justice
Department's refusal to make the records available, reasoning that they had
not been "improperly withheld" under FOIA because they were available
from their primary sources, the district courts.53 The court of appeals re-
versed, reasoning that FOIA only allows agencies to withhold records in
their possession if one of the nine exemptions applies and none did.54 It
also found that the requested materials constituted agency records.5" The
Supreme Court determined that the case involved construction of all three
jurisdictional terms of FOIA: (1) "improperly" (2) "withheld" (3) "agency
records."56
C.A. No. 94-0043 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 11, 1994).
41 Id. at 8.
48 Id. at 6; see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), (b)(4) (1988).
49 492 U.S. 136 (1989) (requiring Department of Justice to make available under
FOIA copies of district court decisions in its possession).
" Id. at 140.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 139-40.
53 Id. at 140-41.
54 Id. at 141.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 142 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1988)).
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Two requirements must be satisfied for requested materials to qualify as
"agency records." First, an agency must either create or obtain the requested
materials." The Court declined to narrow the scope of FOIA to records
generated by the agency because many studies, trade journal reports, and
other materials produced outside of the agencies by both private and govern-
mental organizations form the basis for much agency decisionmaking 8
This concept is important for public access to electronically published mate-
rials because of the possibility that some electronic formats or value-added
features would be generated by others and transferred to an agency. 9
When a government contractor creates the work, the FOIA problem is not
acute because the principles of the common law of agency attribute the
contractor's acts to the agency. However, there are also situations in which
the agency may acquire independently generated information or value-added
features such as computer programs or database formats, and use them to
organize its information. In these circumstances, the conduct of the creator
of the computer programs or formats may not be attributable to the agency.
However, the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Tax Analysts nevertheless
would find the first prong of the agency-record test satisfied because the
agency "obtained" the records.
The second agency-record requirement is that the requested materials be
under the control of the agency at the time the FOIA request is made.6"
This test contemplates that the materials be in the agency's possession
pursuant to the agency's official duties.6" Therefore, the test excludes per-
sonal materials in an employee's possession even though they may be phys-
ically located at the agency, but includes "all books, papers, maps, photo-
graphs, machine readable materials, or other documentary materials, regard-
less of physical form or characteristics, made or received by an agency of
the United States Government under Federal law or in connection with the
transaction of public business."62 The Court deflected concern that its deci-
sion would make it too easy for agencies to be burdened with FOIA re-
quests for materials readily available elsewhere. It determined that requesters
would follow the course of least resistance and generally obtain access to
sources like telephone books and other publications from libraries rather
Id. at 149.
5 Id. at 144-45 (noting frequent references in legislative history to records acquired
by agencies).
'9 For example, it was common in the early days of computerization for agencies to
enter into contracts providing for the contractor to convert paper agency records into
electronic formats, which were then were delivered to the agency. See Perritt, Federal
Electronic Information Policy, supra note 24, at 238 (describing litigation over patent
office contract that gave conversion contractor exclusive rights to electronic formats).
60 Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. at 145.
61 Id.
62 Id. (quoting in part Records Disposal Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3301 (1988)).
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than through the FOIA.6a The Supreme Court left "to another day" resolu-
tion of the issue as to whether materials purposefully transferred to another
agency to avoid a FOIA request would satisfy the control test.'
The Court rejected the Justice Department's arguments that no FOIA
"withholding" was involved because the materials were readily available
from other sources.65 Similarly, the Court rejected the Department's con-
struction of the statutory term "improperly," rejecting in turn the argument
that FOIA does not require disclosure of materials already disclosed and
publicly available,66 the argument that FOIA does not compel disclosure of
materials disclosable under other statutes or rules,67 and the argument that
there is a broad set of circumstances in which refusal to disclose is not
"improper" even though none of the FOIA exemptions applies.6" Justice
Blackmun, the lone dissenter, thought that FOIA was not the appropriate
vehicle for a commercial enterprise to obtain access to raw material.69 The
rejection of Justice Blackmun's views strengthens the inference that FOIA
is an appropriate vehicle for private publishers to obtain access to basic
content for their publications.
In Tax Analysts the Supreme Court thus suggests that the existence of
private property interests in electronic formats does not necessarily preclude
the content from being "agency records." The Court also undercuts the
argument that an agency can avoid a duty to disclose electronic formats
merely because the same content is available in paper formats.
These same propositions are supported by case law involving records
preservation statutes other than FOIA." The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit has rejected the argument that
paper printouts of electronic communication systems are acceptable legal
substitutes for the electronic records themselves.7 It is but a small step
63 Id. at 145 n.5.
64 Id. at 146.
61 Id. at 150.
Id. at 152.
67 Id. at 153-54 (noting disclosure obligations for judicial materials and judicial
conference rules, 28 U.S.C. § 1914 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), and expressing uncertainty
as to whether this section permits a private cause of action to compel disclosure of
court decisions).
68 Id. at 155 (limiting G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the United
States, Inc., 445 U.S. 375 (1980), to circumstances involving a court order not to dis-
close).
69 Id. at 156-57 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
70 In Tax Analysts, the Supreme Court recognized the appropriateness of borrowing
definitional language from records preservation statutes for interpreting FOIA. Id. at
145 (quoting 44 U.S.C. § 3301 (1988)).
7' Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274, 1286-87 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (finding that electronic versions were not merely extra copies of paper versions
because electronic records contain certain additional data).
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from this rejection to the conclusion that the greater utility and accessibility
of electronic formats justifies obligating agencies under FOIA to disclose
them when requesters prefer them over paper versions.72
In Petroleum Information Corp. v. United States Department of the
Interior,73 the D.C. Circuit rejected an argument by the Department of the
Interior that it need not provide a magnetic tape containing a preliminary
version of a comprehensive database of land records for certain states on the
grounds that the material was available in paper form from other sources
and from the agency itself.74 The court also rejected the argument that the
preliminary character of the database in the requested form qualified the
database for exemption under the deliberative process exemption.75 The
mere possibility of adjustment or revision to data does not justify withhold-
ing it under FOIA.76
Disclosure obligations under FOIA do not stop with computer data; the
obligations also include at least some computer programs.77 It may be,
however, that computer programs which uniquely reveal the thought process
of an agency analyst may qualify for the deliberative privilege exemption.7"
2. State Freedom of Information Laws
State public records laws are not identical to FOIA; nor are state court
interpretations of similar language in such state statutes necessarily the same
as federal court interpretation of FOIA. Nevertheless, there is broad agree-
ment on the basic propositions. There is virtually unanimous agreement
among state courts that electronic formats are covered by state freedom of
72 This conclusion was emphasized by many state courts. See infra notes 79-85 and
accompanying text. Cf Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 810 F. Supp.
335, 341 (D.D.C.) (enumerating features of electronic records not present in paper print-
outs of same records), af'd, 1 F.3d 1274 (1993).
73 976 F.2d 1429 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (affirming an order that agency disclose legal
land description computer database file).
74 Id. at 1437.
7' Id. (noting factual character of information and its lack of association with policy
decisions, thus disqualifying it for deliberative process exemption under 5 U.S.C. §
552(b)(5)).
76 Assembly of Cal. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 968 F.2d 916, 922-23 (9th
Cir. 1992) (affirming order requiring disclosure of census data computer tapes despite
argument that adjustments to data elements discernible from tapes would reveal deliber-
ative process).
77 Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton v. Department of Health and Human Services,
844 F. Supp. 770, 781 (D.D.C. 1993) (noting Administrative Conference of the United
States Recommendation 88-10 and concluding that computer program's utility in ma-
nipulating data justifies coverage by FOIA).
78 Id. at 783 (holding that computer programs reflect creator's mental processes and
therefore qualify under the deliberative process exemption).
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information acts.79 There is also strong authority for the proposition that
the requester can specify a computer-readable format when the agency has
both paper and computer-readable formats available.
In State ex rel. Margolius v. City of Cleveland," the Ohio Supreme
Court emphasized that
a set of public records stored in an organized fashion on a
magnetic medium also contains an added value that inher-
ently is a part of the public record. Here, the added value is
not only the organization of the data, but also the compres-
sion of the data into a form that allows greater ease of public
access.
81
The court reached its conclusion that computer-readable versions of public
data must be disclosed by analogy:
[C]onsider two sets of identical public records kept on paper,
with one set organized in a file cabinet, and the other kept as
a random set of papers stacked on the floor. Certainly, we
would not permit an agency to discharge its responsibility by
" See, e.g, Maher v. Freedom of Information Comm'n, 472 A.2d 321, 325 (Conn.
1984) (holding that state Freedom of Information Commission had power to compel
agency to provide computer tapes when requester paid for cost of production, notwith-
standing statutory language that referred to disclosure of "printouts"); Jersawitz v.
Hicks, 448 S.E.2d 352, 353 (Ga. 1994) (finding that real estate deed records on comput-
er tape were considered public record under Open Records Act, Ga. Code Ann. § 50-
18-70(a) (1994)); Stephan v. Harder, 641 P.2d 366, 374 (Kan. 1982) (finding that mag-
netic tapes were considered public record and that requester was entitled to a computer
file listing names of physicians and amount of public funds paid out for abortions);
Minnesota Medical Ass'n v. State, 274 N.W.2d 84, 88 (Minn. 1978) (rejecting argu-
ment that computer tapes containing abortion data were not public records); Brownstone
Publishers, Inc. v. New York City Dep't of Bldgs., 560 N.Y.S.2d 642, 643 (App. Div.
1990) (finding that publisher intending to sell computer databases on subscription basis
was entitled to computer formats with statistical information on every parcel of real
property in New York City, while at the same time noting the undesirability of cost to
agency); Szikszay v. Buelow, 436 N.Y.S.2d 558, 563 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (finding that
county assessment rolls in computer tape format must be disclosed under freedom of
information law). The trial court opinion of Brownstone Publishers, Inc. v. New York
City Dep't of Bldgs., 550 N.Y.S.2d 564 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 560 N.Y.S.2d 642 (App. Div.
1990), noted that the record supported the requesters position that a hard copy would
not provide reasonable access to the information.
80 584 N.E.2d 665 (Ohio 1992).
81 Id. at 669.
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providing access to the random set while precluding the
disclosure of the organized set, even though both sets are
'readable' as required by the statute.82
The Ohio Court of Appeals, relying on Margolius, aptly described the selec-
tion of media this way in Athens County Property Owners Ass'n, Inc., v.
City of Athens:83
The basic tenet ... is that a person does not come-like a
serf-hat in hand, seeking permission of the lord to have
access to public records. Access to public records is a matter
of right. The question in this case is not so much whether
the medium should be hard copy or diskette. Rather, the
question is: Can a government agency, which is obligated to
supply public records, impede those who oppose its policies
by denying the value-added benefit of computerization?84
The court affirmed an order compelling the city to make its diskettes con-
taining rental property information available to the requesters, noting, how-
ever, that to the extent the proprietary software was necessary to make use
of the data, the requesters must obtain their own copies of the proprietary
software. 5
State courts, however, have been less willing to compel agencies to
provide access to computerized information that represents the intellectual
property of private persons. The court in Athens County Property Owners
Ass 'n was careful to avoid suggesting that a requester would be entitled not
only to database information but also to a copy of proprietary software in
order to read the information.86 In Brown v. Iowa Legislative Council,87
the Iowa legislature used public money to buy a database from Election
Data Services, Inc., a private entity.88 The database was built on top of
census data overlaid with political boundaries.89 The data were readable
only with the use of proprietary software which the requester did not
82 Id.
83 619 N.E.2d 437 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
84 Id. at 439.
85 Id. at 439-40 (citing Margolius, 584 N.E.2d at 669 (stating that a governmental
agency must allow copying of computer records if requester shows why paper would be
insufficient medium)).
16 Id. at 439.
87 490 N.W.2d 551 (Iowa 1992).
88 Id. at 552.
89 Id.
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have." The Iowa Supreme Court found that the requisites of trade secret
protection were satisfied and therefore affirmed the trial court's refusal to
order disclosure.9 It recognized, however, the conflict between the rights
of the vendor to its trade secret and "the rights of citizens to information
purchased for the government at public expense."92 It suggested that in oth-
er cases, a trial court could order appropriate disclosure of computerized
materials clothed with trade secrets in a manner that would reconcile the
two conflicting interests. 93 In Margolius, the Ohio Supreme Court held that
"proprietary software does not constitute a public record under R.C.149.43,
even if such software is necessary in order to read public information con-
tained on computer tapes. 94 This holding, however, rather than being justi-
fied by any policy consideration, presented the narrowest conceivable con-
struction of an earlier case that raised doubts about access rights to comput-
erized information. On the facts of Margolius, itself, there was no request
for proprietary software.
Some courts, however, have gone astray and denied access to computer-
readable formats when other means of disclosure were available.95 Many of
these cases contain facts or ambiguous trial records that weaken the force of
their precedental value.96 An early Michigan case suggests that the exis-
tence of a commercial purpose weakens or negates an entitlement to access,
90 Id. at 553.
91 Id. at 553-54.
92 Id. at 554.
93 Id.
94 Margolius, 584 N.E.2d at 668.
9' See Tax Data Corp. v. Hutt, 826 P.2d 353, 356 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (relying on
Dismukes v. Department of Interior, 603 F. Supp. 760 (D.D.C. 1984) and American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees v. County of Cook, 555 N.E.2d
361 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) [hereinafter AFSCME], to deny use of computer terminals
when requesters could make requests to agency personnel who would retrieve the re-
quested information); Chapin v. Freedom of Information Comm'n, 577 A.2d 300, 302-
03 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990) (holding town clerk need not provide computer diskette of
land records index when paper copies were available, in part because the statutory lan-
guage provided for availability of "printout" of computer data), cert. denied, 580 A.2d
56 (Conn. 1990).
9' See Blaylock v. Staley, 732 S.W.2d 152, 153-54 (Ark. 1987) (affirming denial of
request for magnetic tape with voter registration list because of an ambiguous record
which suggested that the requester wanted to borrow equipment from agency); Asbury
Park Press, Inc. v. Department of Health, 558 A.2d 1363, 1366-67 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1989) (finding that newspaper already given underlying data in computer form was
not entitled to spreadsheet which was used to evaluate data either under state records
statute or common law); State ex rel. Recodat Co. v. Buchanan, 546 N.E.2d 203, 205
(Ohio 1989) (denying access to tapes or software necessary to access data). Recodat
was limited by the subsequent Margolius case. See supra notes 80-82, 94 and accompa-
nying text.
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although careful analysis shows that the commercial purpose was relevant to
a balancing of access interests against personal privacy interests.97 In
Dismukes v. Department of the Interior,98 the district court held that the
federal Bureau of Land Management could supply information contained on
a computer tape rather than supplying the computer tape itself.99 Some
state courts have followed Dismukes,"° but many have not.' In an Illi-
nois case, the Illinois Supreme Court held that an agency was not entitled to
satisfy a request for computer readable media with paper formats. 2 The
only bases for refusal recognized by the Illinois Supreme Court were that
satisfying a request for computer media would require the generation of new
programs or formats not presently possessed by the agency, or that the re-
quest for computer media followed too closely on the heels of an earlier
request for the same content in paper form. 3 The Illinois Supreme Court
specifically declined to follow Dismukes."°
Few state freedom of information statutes obligate an agency to set up
new means of access.'0 5 For example, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed
denial of mandamus to compel a clerk of court to set up a means of direct
access via personal computers and modems to real estate deed records that
were provided on magnetic tape.'06 In some cases, the aggregate nature of
computer files has led to the conclusion that privacy exemptions shielded
" Kestenbaum v. Michigan State Univ., 294 N.W.2d 228, 235-36 (Mich. Ct. App.
1980) (finding that existence of commercial purpose negated entitlement to computer
tape containing student records because commercial purpose must be weighed against
privacy invasion in order to apply "clearly unwarranted" test, and because mandating
access to commercially valuable private information violates principle that public funds
may not be used to support a private purpose), aff'd, 327 N.W.2d 783 (Mich. 1982).
98 603 F. Supp. 760 (D.D.C. 1984) (granting agency's motion to dismiss FOIA
claim).
I d. at 762.
'® See Tax Data Corp. v. Hutt, 826 P.2d 353 (Colo. App. 1991) (following Dismukes
and holding that requesters were not entitled to use computer retrieval terminals them-
selves as opposed to submitting requests to agency personnel).
1 See AFSCME, 555 N.E.2d at 364-65 (holding that computer media were covered
by state freedom of information statute, and enumerating exceptions to disclosure obli-
gations; declining to follow Dismukes); Brownstone Publishers, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 565
(declining to follow Dismukes, and requiring agency to supply information on computer
tapes).
102 AFSCME, 555 N.E.2d at 364-65 (holding that computer media were covered by
state freedom of information statute, and enumerating certain exceptions to disclosure
obligations).
103 Id. at 364-67.
"'4 Id. at 365-66.
See Seigle v. Barry, 422 So. 2d 63, 66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that
access must be given to computerized data through programs already in use by public
agency, and that new programs need not be written).
"s Jersawitz v. Hicks, 448 S.E.2d 352 (Ga. 1994).
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them from access even though individual data items within the computerized
collection might be accessible.' °7
Most of the state statutes, like the federal FOIA, do not allow for inter-
est balancing or for assessing the reasons why a requester wants access.
Under such statutes, the only occasion for considering the requester's com-
mercial motivation is when access rights must be balanced against privacy
rights under a privacy exemption.' 8 There, the scope of the privacy ex-
emption depends on whether the invasion of privacy is "unreasonable" or
"unwarranted."' ' To apply this standard, a decision-maker must consider
the interests of the requester to determine whether they should override the
interests of the subject." Nevertheless, a few courts persist in minimizing
the legitimacy of freedom of information requests by electronic publishers.
For example, in Kestenbaum v. Michigan State University,"' the court
held that the legislature's purpose in enacting freedom of information stat-
utes was not to provide a channel between the government and commercial
publishers."2 That proposition overlaps to a considerable extent with the
proposition that mandating disclosure of public information to private pub-
lishers would constitute the use of public funds for private purposes, which
was also a concern of the court in Kestenbaum."3 Both propositions are
flawed.
First, the use of policy and purpose to interpret statutes is only appropri-
ate if the statutory language is ambiguous, and most freedom of information
statutes are not ambiguous; a literal construction of their terms covers com-
107 See Westbrook v. Los Angeles County, 32 Cal. Rptr. 382, 387 (Ct. App. 1994)
(reversing order giving seller of criminal background information access to computer
tapes from municipal court information system on monthly basis and noting qualitative
difference between information from specific docket and aggregate information).
"' United States Dep't of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 114 S. Ct. 1006,
1012 (1994) (stating that in order to decide whether a record is exempt from FOIA
disclosure under Exemption 6, court must "balance the public interest in disclosure
against the interest Congress intended the Exemption to protect" to decide whether inva-
sion of privacy would be "unwarranted") (quoting United States Dep't of Justice v.
Reporters' Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 776 (1989)); United States
Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 177-78 (1991) (balancing privacy against basic
policy of FOIA); Reporters' Comm., 489 U.S. at 771-72 (finding that invasion of pri-
vacy cannot depend on purposes for which request for information is made, that dis-
closure of a private document under Exemption 7(C) must depend on nature of request-
ed document and its relationship to "basic purpose" of FOIA, and that basic purpose is
not served by disclosure of information about private citizens accumulated in various
government files that reveals little or nothing about agency's own conduct).
"o See supra note 108.
"o See supra note 108.
294 N.W.2d 228 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
,12 Id. at 236.
113 Id.
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puter-readable formats. Second, the mere fact that an individual or entity
may obtain income from an activity that serves a public purpose does not
negate the public nature of the activity. When a commercial publisher dis-
seminates public information, it serves a public purpose, the same purpose
that is the 'central justification for the enactment of freedom of information
statutes.
This illusory conflict between public and private purposes is implicated
in a 1994 amendment to the New Jersey public records law" 4 which could
be interpreted to eliminate any statutory right to obtain public information in
electronic formats. The New Jersey Attorney General has taken the position
in litigation now pending before the New Jersey Supreme Court that this
amendment does deny access to electronic formats and that such denial is
good public policy because it prevents private exploitation of materials
developed at public expense."'
In addition to statutory entitlement to public information, many states
recognize a common law entitlement. Such an entitlement was used by the
intermediate court of New Jersey to reverse a lower court and grant access
to electronic versions of tax assessment records." 6 These types of common
law doctrines usually are uncertain in their scope both with respect to the
kinds of information to which they give an access right, and to the kinds of
requests or interests that justify access. Unlike FOIA, these common law
doctrines balance the interest of the requester in obtaining access against the
interest of the public entity in denying access." 7
The policy principles identified earlier in this Article support the inter-
pretation of state records access laws broadly so that they, like the federal
FOIA, extend to all electronic formats and present a counterpoise to public
Pub. L. 1944, c. 140, § 8, approved November 7, 1994. That act authorizes
maintenance of public records in electronic form, and also amends the access provisions
of the New Jersey Right to Know Law:
The right of the citizens of this State to inspect and copy public records pursuant
to Pub. L. 1963, c. 73 (C. 47:1A-1 et seq) shall, with respect to the copying of
records maintained by a system of data processing or image processing, be
deemed to refer to the right to receive printed copies of such records.
Id. The new language is somewhat ambiguous. It could be read only to mean that a re-
questor is entitled at least to paper formats if that is what the requester wants. Or, it
could be read to permit the agency to limit a requester to paper formats even though the
requestor wants electronic formats.
"' See In re Higg-a-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, No. 39,333 (N.J. Feb. 9, 1995),
certifying questions to 647 A.2d 862 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1994). The author of this
Article may participate as an amicus curiae in the presentation of an opposing position
to the New Jersey Supreme Court.
116 Higg-a-Rella, 647 A.2d at 864.
See Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & James A. Wilkinson, Open Advisory Committee and
the Political Process: The Federal Advisory Committee Act After Two Years, 63 GEO.
L.J. 725 (1975) (explaining decline in role of requester interest in public access law).
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agency efforts to set up information monopolies. In other words, state re-
cords access statutes should be written and applied in a manner consistent
with the 1990 ABA policy statement,"' a consistency expressed by most
of the recent state freedom of information judicial decisions.
B. Intellectual Property Law
1. Copyright Protections
The Copyright Act disables federal agencies from obtaining a copyright
in public information. " 9 This disability does not extend, however, to state
or local agencies. Thus, from the literal text of the Copyright Act, state and
municipal governments can copyright their public information resources if
such resources otherwise qualify as copyrightable works. Some states, most
notably New York and Colorado, have even asserted a copyright or quasi-
copyright in judicial and legislative materials, although the legitimacy of
such a position has not been litigated thoroughly.'
There are several constitutional and statutory arguments based outside
the Copyright Act that potentially prohibit or limit state assertion of copy-
right in public information. There are also arguments based on the Copy-
right Act itself and on the Patents and Copyright Clause of the United States
Constitution which potentially limit state or local copyrights in public infor-
mation. Under section 102 of the Copyright Act, copyright does not extend
to factual information.' 2' Moreover, Congress lacks the power under the
Patents and Copyrights Clause of the United States Constitution to extend
copyright protection beyond that which is necessary to provide incentives
for creative efforts. In Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service
Co., 2 2 the Supreme Court of the United States narrowly construed these
statutory and constitutional provisions to eliminate the possibility of copy-
right protection for "sweat of the brow"-the effort in assembling factual
information-except when the selection and arrangement of such informa-
tion involves non-trivial creative contributions.2 3 In no event can copy-
11 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
"9 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1988).
12 But see Legi-Tech, Inc. v. Keiper, 766 F.2d 728 (2d Cir. 1985); cases cited infra
notes 137-81.
12. 17 U.S.C. §102 (1988). Section 102(a) allows copyright in "original works of
authorship." Id. § 102(a). Facts are outside the scope of this phrase because no original
effort is involved with respect to pre-existing facts. To remove any doubt, section
102(b) says that copyright protection does not extend to "any idea, procedure, process,
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery." Id. § 102(b).
122 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
123 Id. at 360.
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right extend to the underlying factual information.'24 The Feist doctrine
and the underlying limits in the copyright statute and clause upon which it is
based should exclude many copyrights in public information. At the very
least, these doctrines exclude state or local copyright in the memorialization
of physical realities. For example, they should not permit a copyright in
survey information or in basic records of land ownership." 5
Beyond that, the Feist analysis should eliminate the possibility of copy-
right in primary judicial and legislative information. The information con-
tained in a statute, legislative committee report, or a judicial opinion is the
recording of an official act. To that extent it is factual. Even if one were to
characterize the underlying communicative act-the words uttered by the
judge or the legislative body-as the sort of creative expression traditionally
entitled to copyright protection, closer scrutiny of the communicative act
shows that it lies beyond the power granted by the Patent and Copyrights
Clause.
The Feist analysis"' proceeds from the proposition that facts may not
be copyrighted because they lack the originality component that is constitu-
tionally mandated as a prerequisite for copyright." 7 This "is true of all
facts-scientific, historical, biographical, and news of the day. 'They may
not be copyrighted and are part of the public domain available to every
person."'"28 There is a reason for that constitutional limitation. The Patents
and Copyright Clause gives power to the Congress to grant limited monopo-
lies only for a particular purpose: to create incentives for original expression
114 Id. at 351.
"5 See Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 353, 355 (S.D. Tex. 1991)
(finding that factual matters such as abstract tract boundaries, ownership name, and tract
size are not copyrightable), rev'd, 967 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1992). The court of appeals
reversed, holding that the district court had erroneously found that the merger doctrine
barred copyright of the plaintiffs maps. Mason, 967 F.2d at 135. The district court had
found that the maps were the only pictorial presentation which could result from a
correct interpretation of the legal description and other uncopyrightable facts. Id. at 138.
The court of appeals disagreed, finding that the underlying data could be portrayed in a
variety of ways. Id. at 139. Thus, under the merger doctrine, the plaintiffs portrayal in
its maps could be protected without preempting free use of the underlying facts. Id. The
court of appeals found that Feist's standards for selection, coordination, and arrange-
ment pertained to application of the merger doctrine, as well as to the threshold ques-
tion of originality. Id. at 140 n.7. The court also found that the plaintiffs added value
satisfied the requirements for originality. Id. at 141.
26 The court in Feist did not elaborate on the logic of limiting copyrightability of
factual information except to point out that the facts must be available for exploitation
by others. There is, however, another component to the Feist logic. See infra notes 134-
36 and accompanying text.
17 Feist, 499 U.S. at 347-48.
128 Id. at 348 (quoting Miller v. Universal Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1369 (5th
Cir. 1981)).
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by authors, and more generally to provide incentives for discovery and other
creative effort. 2 9 Such incentives are entirely unnecessary for legislators
and judges, who have a legally imposed duty to engage in the communica-
tion represented by statutes and judicial opinions. Absent the incentive justi-
fication, Congress lacks the power to extend copyright protection to these
expressions.
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,3° the Supreme Court recog-
nized the appropriateness of analyzing economic incentives in deciding the
scope of copyright protection for derivative works. The Court explained that
"[t]he licensing of derivatives is an important incentive to the creation of
originals."'' Justice Kennedy also recognized the importance of incentive
analysis. In his concurring opinion, he expressed his concern that too broad
an interpretation of the fair use privilege with respect to parodies and deriv-
atives would "reduc[e] the financial incentive to create."'' The courts of
appeals have routinely recognized this centrality of economic incentive as
the justification for copyright. 33
When the incentive is not needed, as when the authors in question are
legally obligated to perform their creative effort, the Patents and Copyright
Clause does not authorize a copyright. This is exactly the situation that
exists for the work product of public officials. As long as they are not act-
ing ultra vires, they are performing public duties when collecting and as-
sembling information. Even if some of their selection and arrangement
would seem to qualify under the Feist originality test, the creative compo-
nent of their selection and arrangement does not stem from the economic
incentive provided by the copyright law because it is legally mandated and
therefore fails to qualify under Feist. Whenever a public duty is the cause of
the expression, the incentive justification under the copyrights and patent
laws is absent, and any construction of the Copyright Act to protect such
official work product would be unconstitutional.
Of course, this statutory and constitutional copyright argument does not
129 Id. at 349-50.
130 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994) (reversing determination that rap group's parody of copy-
righted song was not fair use).
131 Id. at 1178 & n.23 (explaining why prima facie protection extends to derivative
works).
132 Id. at 1181 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
133 See National Rifle Ass'n v. Hand Gun Control Fed'n, 15 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir.
1994) (noting that scope of prima facie copyright protection is limited to uses of work
that would undermine incentive for creation; use of mailing list was fair use), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 71 (1994); see also Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 429 (1984) (discussing goals and incentives of copyright protection); Twentieth
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (finding that "ultimate aim is,
by this incentive [to secure a fair return for an author's creative labor], to stimulate
artistic creativity for the general public good").
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eliminate the possibility of extending copyright protection to value-added
enhancements to public information so long as they are not supplied during
the performance of a public duty. However, even though incentive may
seem an appropriate justification for copyright protection, the Court in Feist
specifically rejected the idea that originality can result simply from gather-
ing facts."l4 It rejected "sweat of the brow" justification for copyright. 5
Moreover, even copyrighted compilations are copyrightable only to the
extent of their original selection or arrangement. "[A] subsequent compiler
remains free to use the facts contained in another's publication to aid in
preparing a competing work, so long as the competing work does not fea-
ture the same selection and arrangement."' 36
Several cases support the proposition that states may not assert a copy-
right in some public materials even though copyright statutes seem to permit
it. Building Officials & Code Administration v. Code Technology, inc., 37
for example, holds that neither judicial opinions nor statutes can be copy-
righted. 38  The case concerned the Building Officials and Code
Administration's right to copyright a model regulatory building code. The
plaintiff, Building Officials and Code Administration (BOCA), claimed it
held a copyright for its publication of The BOCA Basic Building Code,
which it encouraged public authorities to adopt through a licensing pro-
gram. 39 The Commonwealth of Massachusetts adopted and distributed a
building code based substantially on BOCA's model code, pursuant to a
licensing agreement granted by BOCA. 4 ' The Commonwealth referred
persons wanting to purchase a copy of the code to BOCA. 4' The defen-
dant, Code Technology, Inc. (CT), a private publisher, published and distrib-
uted its own edition of the Massachusetts building code.'"2 CT's edition
was essentially the same as the BOCA edition with a few additional regula-
tions. 43 The district court granted BOCA a preliminary injunction against
CT, finding probability of success in BOCA's claim that the CT code violat-
ed BOCA's copyright.'" The First Circuit reversed, addressing a question
not addressed by the district court: "[W]hether inclusion of [the BOCA
created materials] ... [would have] the effect of rendering the [BOCA]
materials . . . freely available for copying by anyone," not withstanding
134 Feist, 499 U.S. at 347.
135 Id. at 359.
136 Id. at 349.
137 628 F.2d 730 (1st Cir. 1980).
138 Id. at 736.







SOURCES OF RIGHTS TO ACCESS PUBLIC INFORMATION
BOCA's copyright.'45
CT argued that because the BOCA code was adopted by the state as a
set of administrative regulations having the force of law, it had lost its copy-
right protection and thus entered the public domain.'46 CT noted a line of
cases dating back to the mid-1800s which held that "judicial opinions and
statutes are in the public domain and.., not subject to copyright protec-
tion," and argued this rule should be extended to cover administrative regu-
lations such as the Massachusetts building code since these regulations have
the force of law and are enforced by penal sanctions.'47 BOCA argued that
the building code was not like judicial opinions or statutes because it was
written by a private organization at its own expense and not by the govern-
ment at public expense.'48
Synthesizing from this early case law, the First Circuit reasoned that the
public "owns the law" not just because it pays the salaries of those who
write the statutes and judicial opinions, but because "[e]ach citizen is a
ruler-a law-maker," and therefore "[t]he citizens are the authors of the
law."'49 Beyond that, the court found that due process guarantees access
because it requires notice of legal obligations. 5 ' It also found these princi-
ples irreconcilable with BOCA's claims to limit access under the copyright
law, and to decide for itself when, where, and how the code was to be re-
produced and made publicly available.'' Nevertheless, the court left "the
door slightly ajar" for BOCA to argue, based on a more complete trial re-
cord, that it was entitled to some protection by relying on the distinctions
between privately authored model codes, publicly authored statutes, and
judicial opinions.'
The court in Building Officials analyzed several cases dating from the
1800s to support its reasoning and conclusion.'53 In Wheaton v. Peters, 54
the Supreme Court stated, without offering much analytical support, that "no
" Id. at 731. The court of appeals stopped short of "ruling definitely on the underly-
ing legal issues," finding only that the BOCA's probability of success was insufficient
to justify a preliminary injunction. Id.
146 Id. at 733.
147 Id.
148 Id.
,4 Id. (citing Banks v. West, 27 F. 50, 57 (C.C.D. Minn. 1886)).
So Id. at 734.
' Id. at 735.
152 Id. at 736; see also Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet Management Sys., Inc., 591 F.
Supp. 726, 736 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (holding that map filed in Interstate Commerce Com-
mission is tariff distinguishable from statutes and opinions promulgated by public offi-
cials, and from BOCA code adopted by public officials, even though public is bound by
tariff).
113 Building Officials, 628 F.2d at 732-34.
'- 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
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reporter has or can have any copyright in the written opinions delivered by
this court; and judges thereof cannot confer on any reporter any such
right."155
A later Supreme Court case, Banks v. Manchester,'56 invalidated a
state law which purported to allow an official reporter to obtain a copyright
on the opinions of the Ohio Supreme Court. 57 The reporter could not
claim authorship of the opinions, and the state was not a "citizen or resi-
dent" under copyright law' and thus could not obtain a copyright for it-
self.159 The Court stated "that work done by ... judges constitutes the au-
thentic exposition and interpretation of the law ... [and] is free for publica-
tion to all."'6
In Nash v. Lathrop,'6' the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court or-
dered the reporter of decisions to permit a competing publisher to examine
and copy opinions in the reporter's custody.'62 The court stated:
Every citizen is presumed to know the law thus declared,
and it needs no argument to show that justice requires that
all should have free access to the opinions, and that it is
against sound public policy to prevent this, or to suppress
and keep from the earliest knowledge of the public the stat-
utes, or the decisions and opinions of the justices.'63
The court avoided deciding whether the state itself could hold a copyright in
the opinions, deciding only that the state had not granted an exclusive right
to the reporter, Little, Brown & Co.' The court also stated that the pub-
lisher had the right to make reasonable regulations to prevent damage or
disruption to the orderly management of its official papers.'65
'I Id. at 668.
156 128 U.S. 244 (1888).
15' Id. at 252-53.
"' Id. at 253. There is room for a similar argument under the present Copyright Act,
which allows copyright only to a "national or domiciliary of the United States, or ... a
national, domiciliary, or sovereign authority of a foreign nation." 17 U.S.C. § 104(b)(1)
(1988). The language pertaining to U.S. authors excludes institutional authors, while the
language pertaining to foreign authors appears to allow governments to be statutory
authors.
5 Banks, 128 U.S. at 253.
160 id.
161 6 N.E. 559 (Mass. 1886).
162 Id. at 563.
163 Id. at 560.
" Id. Most of the court's analysis focused on the state statute authorizing the con-
tract with Little, Brown & Co. Id. at 559-63.
165 Id. at 563.
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The court in Building Officials also cited two earlier cases, Davidson v.
Wheelock' and Howell v. Miller,'67 which held that "although the re-
porter could obtain a valid copyright on his compilation and analysis, any-
one could freely copy the laws themselves." '68 Furthermore, "no one can
obtain the exclusive right to publish the laws of a state in a book prepared
by him."'69 If one cuts from another's book the general laws of a state
and uses the pages thus cut, and nothing more from the first work, in pre-
paring a competing compilation, then there would be no copyright infringe-
ment. 7°
In In re Gould & Co.,' the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the
reporter of opinions was not entitled by his copyright or by the exclusive
franchise granted him by the secretary of state to withhold slip opinions
from competing publishers.' Among other things, the court noted that the
reporter's duty was to allow the public to make copies without inquiry as to
the requester's purpose.'" It suggested in dictum, however, that the state
could copyright the text of judicial opinions through legislation. 74
Georgia v. Harrison Co.'75 directly brought into play the possibility of
a copyright owned by the state, whereas the earlier cases involved assertion
of copyright by state contractors.'76 The state of Georgia cited 17 U.S.C. §
105 "which specifically provides that copyright protection is not available
for any work of the [U.S.] government" and argued that "if Congress had
wanted to preclude states from having copyright protection it should have so
provided in the Copyright Act."'77 The court denied a preliminary injunc-
tion against a competing publisher,' noting that "[t]he courts of this
country have long held that neither judicial opinions nor statutes can be
'- 27 F. 61 (C.C.D. Minn. 1866) (denying injunction against a competing publication
of legislative materials because there was no copying of marginal notes or references,
and because only text of law was copied). The copyright in the statutory compilation
was "awarded" to the plaintiff as the low bidder. Id.
167 91 F. 129 (6th Cir. 1898) (affirming denial of injunction against competing pub-
lisher of state code). Much of the opinion evaluated and rejected the defendants' argu-
ment that they could not be enjoined from publication because they had been ordered
by the state to publish their compilation.
16' Building Officials, 628 F.2d at 734.
169 Howell, 91 F. at 137.
17 Building Officials, 628 F.2d at 734 (citing Howell, 91 F. at 137).
"' 2 A. 886 (Conn. 1885).
2 Id. at 892-93.
173 Id. at 890.
174 Id. at 892.
... 548 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ga. 1982), vacated, 559 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Ga. 1983)
(vacated on unanimous request of the parties after settlement).
176 See supra notes 166-67, 171 and accompanying text.
... Harrison, 548 F. Supp. at 114.
171 Id. at 117. .
1995] 203
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
copyrighted," and that "a state's 'ownership' of its statutes does not pre-
clude anyone from publishing those statutes." '179 The rationale for prohibit-
ing copyright in such materials applied, the court found, regardless of
whether the state itself or a private citizen asserts a copyright.80 "The
public must have free access to state laws, unhampered by any claim of
copyright, whether that claim be made by an individual or the state it-
self." '
2. Trademark Protection
If copyright is not an appropriate way to manage the dissemination of
public information, another type of intellectual property, trademark, may
prove useful. Trademark is potentially available to all three levels of govern-
ment, and it raises fewer problems in realizing the policy precepts. Trade-
mark is aimed at protecting the reputation for quality associated with partic-
ular suppliers of goods and services by reducing the likelihood of consumer
confusion about the origin of similar products and services. 82 Thus, as-
suming other statutory criteria are satisfied, a public agency could obtain a
trademark for its information products and limit the use of that trademark to
those it has licensed. 83 Conceivably, a state legislature could obtain a
trademark for the "official version" of state statutes and deny use of the
trademark to unofficial sources. This form of intellectual property permits
public agencies to reduce risks of poor quality information that might harm
the public, and at the same time permits a diversity of channels and sources
to exist. If, over time, the consuming public prefers an unofficial source, it
could have that source available and be perfectly free to reject the trade-
marked official source.
'71 Id. at 114.
180 Id.
181 Id.
82 Nebraska Irrigation, Inc. v. Koch, 523 N.W.2d 676 (Neb. 1994) (finding no in-
fringement of trade name because there was no likelihood of public confusing two trade
names and doing business with a mistaken party).
183 For example, Smokey the Bear is a statutory trademark. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 711
(West Supp. 1994); see also 19 Op. Att'y Gen. 361 (1889) (deciding that United States'
.appropriated figure of an eagle with letters "U.S." under it is protected and may not be
used by private manufacturers). But cf. Vuitton Et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., Inc.,
644 F.2d 769, 775 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that national insignia is unprotectable);
George Washington Mint, Inc. v. Washington Mint, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 255, 262
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (finding trademark of doubtful validity because it might mislead cus-
tomers into thinking they were doing business with government); In re Application of
Gorham Mfg. Co., 41 App. D.C. 263 (1913) (affirming denial of registration of mark
that looked like official seal of British government agency).
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C. First Amendment Arguments
Even if the Copyright Act were interpreted to extend to public informa-
tion at the state and local level, the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution" 4 and similar state constitutional grants of privileges and im-
munities with respect to communication and expression would limit the
assertion of such copyright. The same First Amendment and state constitu-
tional doctrines would also limit the assertion of information monopolies
supported by any other source of law. The First Amendment enters the
access controversy in two ways: as a limitation on direct restrictions on
access and publication, and as a limitation on copyright.
There are two ways to support any monopoly: by denying access to the
raw material for, the monopolist's product or service, and by imposing a
duty on potential competitors of the monopolist not to sell the monopoly
product or perform the monopoly service. Enforcement of a duty not to
disseminate directly conflicts with the First Amendment, while the denial of
a right to access indirectly conflicts.
When a monopoly is granted or asserted with respect to public informa-
tion, the monopoly is enforced by denying access to the underlying public
information within the scope of the monopoly, and also by imposing a duty
not to publish or disseminate that public information. For many years the
United States Supreme Court has recognized that access to information is
essential to the kind of democratic political system the First Amendment
seeks to protect.'85 The First Amendment particularly disfavors discrimina-
tion against certain messages or certain types of communicators." 6 Thus, a
redisseminator of public information that is denied access to public infor-
mation because it is a redisseminator would argue that the First Amendment
makes such selective denial of access unconstitutional. This argument would
have equal force regardless of whether the discriminatory denial is based on
state statute or common law. A redisseminator threatened with sanctions
based on state law for redisseminating in competition with a state-sanctioned
monopolist would argue that the source of law authorizing the sanctions
violates the First Amendment and therefore is unconstitutional.
The Second Circuit accepted the general proposition that the First
Amendment can entitle a publisher to electronic formats of state legislative
"' "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
'85 Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2470 (1994) (recognizing
relationship between access to information and First Amendment), reh 'g denied, 115 S.
Ct. 30 (1994).
186 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986) (finding
compelled access cannot discriminate against or in favor of particular points of view).
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material in Legi-Tech, Inc. v. Keiper.'87 Legi-Tech sought to enjoin New
York state officials from denying it access to a state-owned computerized
database that contained legislative information and was available through
subscription to the general public. 88 Legi-Tech marketed a computerized
information retrieval service that summarized pending legislation, votes on
bills, attendance and voting records of legislators, and campaign contribu-
tions of the New York and California legislators. 89 The state of.New York
offered a similar service to the public known as a "Legislative Retrieval
Service" (LRS)."9 ° The primary difference between the two services was
that LRS offered a full text of New York bills, while Legi-Tech offered
only a summary. 9 ' Also, LRS did not offer information about voting and
attendance records of, and campaign contributions to, legislators.'
In response to Legi-Tech's original state court action requiring the Leg-
islative Bill Drafting Commission of New York to offer LRS to Legi-Tech
on the same terms as it was offered to other customers, New York enacted
Chapter 257 of the New York Laws.'93 Chapter 257 authorized the legisla-
ture to "engage in the sale of any of the foregoing services ... to such
entities [as] the president of the senate and speaker of the assembly...
deem appropriate, except those entities which offer for sale the services of
an electronic information retrieval system which contains data relating to the
proceedings of the legislature."'94 Legi-Tech fell within the prohibitory
portion of the statute and challenged the statute as unconstitutional because
it denied Legi-Tech's rights to freedom of speech and of the press.'95 The
district court considered Chapter 257 reasonable because it only sought to
protect the state's natural monopoly on computer supplied, legislative infor-
mation.'96 The district court also determined that LRS would be driven out
of business if competitors were not restricted and could retransmit the
state's data at lower prices.) 7
The Second Circuit disagreed with the district court's legal theories and
remanded for further findings.'98 The court found that New York's statute
limited Legi-Tech's access to information and also its right of publica-
187 766 F.2d 728 (2d Cir. 1985).
188 Id. at 730.





9 Id. (quoting chapter 257).
195 Id.
196 Id. at 731-32.
197 Id. at 732.
198 Id.
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tion.' 9 It also found that such restrictions could prevent Legi-Tech from
publishing the full text of pending bills in New York in a package with
relevant political information in a timely fashion."° The court of appeals
further noted that information about legislative proceedings is "vital to the
functioning of government and to the exercise of political speech, which is
at the core of the First Amendment." ''
Legi-Tech asserted that LRS automatically received copies of any intro-
duced legislation and published the contents before they were available to
other dissemination channels. 2 On some occasions the legislation was en-
acted before a printed copy was available to the public, but after it was
transmitted to LRS.0 3 Denying the private press access to such informa-
tion was an exercise in censorship which allowed the government to control
the form and content of the information reaching the public.", There was
nothing natural about a monopoly that arose "out of a combination of LRS'
special access to information and Chapter 257's prohibition on competitors
from having access to LRS' database. 2 5
Thus, resolution of the discriminatory access issue on remand must turn
on whether Legi-Tech could obtain printed copies of pending bills or other
legislative information on substantially the same terms as LRS. 26 The
court of appeals perceived "no merit in the proposition that government may
accord a state organ of communication preferential access to information
and deny to the private press the right to retransmit the information. 2 7
Legi-Tech also claimed Chapter 257 was unconstitutional because the
law denied it the same access to LRS that was offered to the public.0
The court held that the press has the same right of access to governmental
proceedings as the general public.2 9 Furthermore, "the government may
not single out the press to bear special burdens, even if evenhanded imposi-
tion of the identical burdens would be constitutionally permissible.
210





203 Id. at 733.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 736.
207 Id. at 733. "The evils inherent in allowing government to create a monopoly over
the dissemination of public information in any form seem too obvious to require extend-
ed discussion." Id.
208 Id. at 734.
209 Id. (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Estes v.
Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965)).
210 Id. at 734.
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to prevent competitors from getting a free ride on its costly investment.2"'
This argument is similar to the justification for copyright protection."2
While not rejecting outright this justification for the discrimination, the court
of appeals did refuse to accept the existing scheme which absolutely barred
republication, rather than set a price that would negate free riding.2"3 On
remand, Legi-Tech's entitlement to access to LRS would depend in part on
Legi-Tech's burden of creating the same electronic enhancements itself."4
When copyright is the basis for access or publication restrictions, the
First Amendment plays a background role. The Ninth Circuit considered a
clash between First Amendment interests and copyright protection in Los
Angeles News Service v. Tullo."5 The plaintiff, Los Angeles News Service
(LANS), videotaped the sites of an airplane crash and train wreck and li-
censed television stations to use them on news programs.2"6 The defen-
dants, associates of Audio Video Reporting Services (AVRS), made video
recordings of the news programs and marketed the recordings to individuals
and businesses.2"7 The court of appeals rejected AVRS' argument that the
raw videotapes were not entitled to copyright protection because they merely
recorded real world events, applying the general rule that almost any photo-
graph is copyrightable because it "reflects the personal reaction of an indi-
vidual upon nature."' Moving on to the First Amendment issues, the
court noted that "[c]opyright law incorporates First Amendment goals by
ensuring that copyright protection extends only to the forms in which ideas
21, Id. at 735.
212 See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo, 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (analyz-
ing need for fair use privilege in terms of risk of free riding on copyright holder's
work); New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308
n.6 (9th Cir. 1991) (explaining fair use defense in terms of risk of free riding); Lee B.
Burgunder, Trademark and Copyright: How Intimate Should the Close Association
Become, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 89 & nn.26-27 (1989) (noting that common purpose
of trademark, copyright, and patent is to prevent free riding).
213 Legi-Tech, 766 F.2d at 735-36. Legi-Tech stipulated that it would be willing to
pay a higher price than the general public, and the court speculated that this might
encompass a price that would reflect lost revenue to LRS. Id.
214 Id. at 736.
.215 973 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1992).
216 Id. at 792.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 793 (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250
(1903)). The Court cited Judge Learned Hand and Professor Melville B. Nimmer as
supporting this general rule. Id. at 793-94. It rejected reliance on Cable News Network,
Inc. v. Video Monitoring Service of America, 940 F.2d 1471 (11 th Cir. 1991) (revers-
ing preliminary injunction against copyright or selling network programming), vacated,
949 F.2d 378 (1 1th Cir. 1991), because the court dismissed the appeal en banc and the
panel decision was vacated. Los Angeles News Serv., 973 F.2d at 794 n.4.
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and information are expressed and not to the ideas and information them-
selves." '219
Moreover, First Amendment considerations enter into the determination
of whether a given use of a particular work is fair use and therefore privi-
leged under the Copyright Act.22 Because there was no showing that en-
forcement of the copyright limited the public access to the facts contained
therein, the court thought the problem perceived by Professor Nimmer-that
the idea/expression dichotomy codified in 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) would not
adequately protect First Amendment interests-was not present in the case
before it.22' Thus, under the Los Angeles News Service analysis, whether
the First Amendment allows a copyright in public information depends on
the availability of the underlying information to the public through reason-
able means of access.
The Supreme Court has accepted this basic idea.222 The Court has not-
ed that "[i]t is fundamentally at odds with the scheme of copyright to accord
lesser rights in those works that are of greatest importance to the pub-
lic. '223 Combining fair use and First Amendment analysis justifies strong
copyright protection for private sector redisseminators of public information,
while at the same time questions copyright protection for the public infor-
mation itself, where the incentives that underlie copyright are not needed.
The congruence of fair use and First Amendment analysis also justifies
considering First Amendment principles when shaping the boundaries of fair
use, especially when public information is involved.
There are two important limitations on the First Amendment and similar
state constitutional arguments, however. The first limitation has to do with
29 Los Angeles News Serv., 973 F.2d at 795.
220 Id. (noting, however, that Professor Nimmer's suggestion that the idea-expression
dichotomy in fair use doctrine may not adequately protect First Amendment interests);
see MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1. 10(c)(2), at
1-83 to 1-84 (1992 ed.); see also Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications Int'l, Ltd., 996
F.2d 1366, 1378 (2d Cir. 1993) (explaining that "except perhaps in an extraordinary
case, 'the fair use doctrine encompasses all claims of first amendment in the copyright
field"'). The fair use doctrine, codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988), extends a privilege
to certain socially desirable republication which otherwise would be copyright infringe-
ment.
22 Los Angeles News Serv., 973 F.2d at 796.
222 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1985)
(describing definitional balance between First Amendment and copyright as incorporated
into idea/expression dichotomy, and noting that straightforward news reports are not
copyrightable, but declining to expand fair use to destroy any expectation of copyright
protection in work of a public figure). The "Framers intended copyright itself to be the
engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to the use of one's ex-
pression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas." Id.
at 558.
223 Id. at 559.
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the nature of the public information at issue. The First Amendment is con-
cerned with public debate.224 Certain content is closer to the core of that
concern than are other contents. For example, the proceedings of a state
legislature are much easier to relate to robust public debate then are the
records of public utility easements across private property. It is thus con-
ceivable that First Amendment protection of access to public information
and First Amendment frustration of state monopolies on public information
might be limited to legislative, judicial, and administrative agency decisional
information and not extended to more utilitarian content like that involved in
geographic information systems. Nevertheless, even geographic information
pertains directly to property ownership and the use of public ways. Not only
is enjoyment of property-a core interest protected by the United States
Constitution and state constitutions-tied up in this type of information, but
there is also much political debate surrounding the ownership and use of
property."' It would be hard for a public entity to sustain the position that
one can participate effectively in a debate about a zoning ordinance without
access to the zoning map, even though the map is arguably utilitarian as
much as it is decisional.
The other limitation on First Amendment arguments is potentially more
serious. Frequently, restrictions on redissemination are not imposed by stat-
ute or common law, but by contract. Someone is licensed to use a product
containing public information but the license imposes restrictions on types
of use, and frequently disallows redissemination. Someone who agrees to
such a license may arguably have waived any First Amendment entitlement
to engage in the conduct prohibited by the license restrictions. The counter-
argument would be that there is an underlying constitutional right to the
information covered by the license, and that the licensor, usually a public
entity, may not condition the exercise of this constitutionally protected ac-
cess right on the giving up of other constitutional rights. Alternatively, the
licensee could argue that the license restriction is state action that constitutes
unconstitutional discrimination against certain licensees-those intending to
engage in constitutionally protected communicative acts of redissemination.
224 But see Eberhardt v. O'Malley, 17 F.3d 1023, 1026 (7th Cir. 1994) (reversing
dismissal of police officer's complaint alleging that he was dismissed for writing a
novel based on his experiences at the police department and district attorney's office,
stating that "[t]he First Amendment protects entertainment as well as treatises on poli-
tics and public administration").
225 For example, a WESTLAW search on March 19, 1995 of the "Allcases" database
using the term "regulatory taking" retrieved 592 cases. This level of litigation over
regulations that arguably constitute takings of property under the Fifth Amendment,
exemplifies the level of debate more generally in a wide variety of forums.
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D. Antitrust Arguments
The federal antitrust laws favor competition and thus provide legal sup-
port for the information policy diversity precepts. Someone suffering anti-
trust' injury226 caused by a monopoly of public information can collect
damages and obtain injunctions against maintenance of the monopoly. An
explicit establishment or grant of an information monopoly would be a
prima facie violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act2" and also, assum-
ing contracts between legally separate entities were involved, Section 1 of
the Sherman Act.22' The only plausible argument against prima facie lia-
bility would be based on limited competitive effect.229 A defender of an
exclusive arrangement for electronic formats could argue that electronic
formats and paper formats constitute substitute products and therefore the
restraint on competition is to be judged by considering the overall market
for particular information, including paper and electronic formats. Because
of the dramatic differences between utility and cost, however, it is far more
likely that the markets for electronic formats and paper formats would be
considered separately for purposes of assessing the competitive effect of the
state-granted monopoly.
230
Not all state-granted monopolies result in liability under the federal
antitrust laws, however. States and municipalities regularly grant franchises
226 Consumers are the primary intended beneficiaries of the antitrust laws. Atlantic
Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 344 (1990) (reinstating summary
judgment for defendant in antitrust case and explaining antitrust injury and standing re-
quirement; distinguishing consumers from competitors). Thus, consumers are more
likely to have standing to litigate violations of the Sherman Act than are competitors of
those engaging in the alleged illegal conduct.
227 Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization. 15 U.S.C., § 2 (1988).
228 Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits combinations or conspiracies that restrain
trade, and thus focuses on contracts that fix prices or limit output. Id. § 1 (1988).
229 Except for per se violations of Section 1, conduct potentially violating the
Sherman Act is judged under a "rule of reason" analysis, which weighs the anti-compet-
itive effect against pro-competitive effect; anti-competitive effect is judged with respect
to a particular market. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct.
2072, 2090 (1992) (remanding to determine whether manufacturer unlawfully tied sale
of services to sale of parts for its line of micrographic equipment).
230 Competitive effect in a defined market is essential for determining whether Sec-
tion 2 has been violated because one cannot determine if a monopoly exists except
relative to a particular market. Market definition is less central, but still important, to
Section 1 analysis. However, an explicit monopoly over publishing and distributing pub-
lic information is likely to be classified as a per se violation of Section 1 rather than
being evaluated under the rule of reason. Furthermore, market definition is far more
important for rule of reason analysis because that analysis requires balancing pro-com-
petitive against anti-competitive effects.
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and set prices for products and services. Similarly, a state monopoly with
respect to public information might qualify for the "state action" exemp-
tion13' to the antitrust laws. In some areas, such as insurance regulation,
Congress has explicitly immunized from antitrust liability certain state regu-
latory activities.2 32 Exclusive cable television franchises escape antitrust
prohibitions both because they are sanctioned by the Cable Communications
Act, and because they are made legitimate by local regulatory interests.233
There is no such explicit exemption for other state monopolies which may
regulate electronic publishing.3
There is, however, a residual state action exemption premised on feder-
alism and its respect for state sovereignty.23 Many state regulatory pro-
grams are immunized from antitrust liability even though they limit competi-
tion because of the need to allow some elbow room for state regulatory
power. In the late 1970s and 1980s the Supreme Court held that municipali-
ties236 were not entitled to state action immunity on their own, and that
they must derive any immunity from state legislative authorization.237
231 See infra notes 232-43 and accompanying text.
232 See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1988) (immunity from antitrust
laws for state-regulated business of insurance).
233 47 U.S.C. § 521 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see Preferred Communications, Inc. v.
City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985) (city had antitrust immunity with
respect to cable television franchising).
234 The Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (1988), ex-
empts local governments and persons acting under their direction from damages, inter-
est, and attorneys' fees under the antitrust laws, while leaving intact substantive anti-
trust law analysis. "The bill eliminates certain damage suits under the Clayton Act
without altering judicial interpretation of the substantive antitrust law. For example,
there will be no change in the substantive antitrust law applicable to local governments,
or persons with whom they deal, in suits for injunctive relief under Section 16 of the
Clayton Act, or in enforcement actions by the Department of Justice or the Federal
Trade Commission under other statutory provisions." H.R. REP. No. 965, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4602, 4603.
231 See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Hospital Bd. of Directors, 38 F.3d 1184 (1 1th Cir.
1994) (finding that state action requirement shielded purchase by county hospital board
of private hospital because powers granted to political subdivision by state contemplated
anti-competitive effect); Continental Bus Sys., Inc. v. City of Dallas, 386 F. Supp. 359,
363 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (finding that state action doctrine precluded antitrust liability of
city which granted exclusivity to certain bus lines serving airport).
236 Municipalities in this sense includes counties. State action immunity at the munic-
ipal and county level is important to public information policy because of the large
stock of land records held at that level. Margit Livingston, Public Access to Virginia's
Tidelands, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 669, 725 n.12 (1983) (referring to practice of
locating land records in offices where property is located).
237 See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 39-42 (1985) (finding that
municipalities are not immune by virtue of their status because they are not themselves
sovereign, and that state may not validate municipal anti-competitive conduct simply by
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Then, in the mid-1980s, the Supreme Court relaxed federal antitrust scrutiny
of municipal anti-competitive arrangements.238 No longer must a munici-
pality demonstrate explicit state legislative intent to supplant competition
with regulation. It is enough to show that the state legislature clearly con-
templated municipal anti-competitive activity or that such activity was fore-
seeable or the logical result of the legislation.239 On the other hand, anti-
competitive action under the authority of a general home rule grant would
not qualify because the legislative direction is not specific enough.4
Moreover, active supervision of the municipality by the state is no longer
required.241 When the municipality sanctions private anti-competitive con-
duct, the supervision of the private conduct need be only general and poten-
tial.242
One respected commentator, Philip Areeda, suggests that proprietary
activities by municipal governments, meaning "public activities that compete
directly with private firms in the open market and that differ from them only
in stockholder identity," might be subject to greater antitrust scrutiny, al-
though he expresses concern that drawing the distinction between propri-
etary and non-proprietary activities always has proven troublesome.243
Conversely, one could argue that states and municipalities should be entitled
to grant exclusive franchises to private entities to perform services that
otherwise would be performed by the government itself. Because govern-
ments historically had a natural or de jure monopoly on performance of
declaring it to be lawful, but may authorize it and thereby confer immunity even if
municipal activities not compelled and not supervised by state); City of Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 393-94 (1978) (finding that municipal
electric power company was not automatically exempt from antitrust scrutiny); id. at
422 & n.3 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (suggesting that proprietary activities of municipal-
ities should not be exempt from Sherman Act).
238 See generally Thomas M. Gorde, Antitrust and the New State Action Doctrine: A
Return to Deferential Economic Federalism, 75 CAL. L. REv. 227, 228 (1987) (explain-
ing trilogy of cases that substantially clarified application of state action doctrine to
municipalities).
239 Id. at 242 (citing Hallie, 471 U.S. at 42).
24 Id. at 242 & n.97 (citing Hallie, 471 U.S. at 43); see also Community Communi-
cations, Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 52 (1982).
24" Gorde, supra note 238, at 245 (discussing Hallie, 471 U.S. at 46 & n.10).
242 Id. (discussing Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States,
471 U.S. 48, 51, 61 n.23, 66 (1985)).
243 Philip Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for "State Action" after Lafayette, 95 HARV. L.
REv. 435, 443 (1981) (suggesting that waste disposal, water service, municipal trans-
port, and public parts probably should not be included in proprietary category and that
mere regulation of zoning, cable television, and other public franchises would not be
proprietary). But see Building and Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders and
Contractors, 113 S. Ct. 1190, 1198 (1993) (allowing project labor agreement not pre-
empted by federal labor law because proprietary rather than regulatory in character).
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public services exempt from antitrust liability, the argument would go, they
should be able to delegate this immunity to their contractors. Winning with
this argument, however, should depend on sustaining the proposition that
competition for the privatized service would harm essential public interests.
Because public information policy benefits from a multiplicity of sources
and channels, the opposite is true. A monopoly is not supportive and contra-
venes public interest.
E. Burdens on Interstate Commerce
Because of the likelihood that a diversity of channels and sources for
public information would involve interstate commerce, a state-sanctioned
monopoly on such information adversely affects interstate commerce. Such
an effect is permissible, but only if it is justified by the pursuit of a legiti-
mate state interest.2" This criterion is not always satisfied.
Suppose a county sets up its land records in electronic form, and permits
electronic access only under an exclusive contract whereby anyone obtaining
electronic access must agree not to compete or disclose the information to
anyone else. Effectively, the county has set up a monopoly in this market.
Assume further that an out-of-state entrepreneur would like to purchase
these electronic land records; yet the entrepreneur does not want to sign the
licensing agreement because it wants to incorporate the records into a larger
database of land records from many geographic areas. This section considers
whether the above hypothetical would violate the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution.245
The "dormant Commerce Clause" refers to an implied limitation on state
power arising from the Commerce Clause. The underlying issue is whether
the grant of power to Congress to control interstate commerce found in
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution prevents states from regulating in-
terstate commerce in a subject area not addressed or dealt with explicitly by
244 See infra notes 246-66 and accompanying text.
24' The grant of power to Congress to control commerce both with foreign nations
and between the states of the United States is found in Article I, Section 8 of the Unit-
ed States Constitution. This clause states: "The Congress shall have power ... to regu-
late commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian
Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Essentially, this clause serves as a grant of power to
the Federal Congress and also as a limitation on state legislative power. Commerce is
defined broadly. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)
(finding that hotel was providing lodging to out-of-state people, and that since black
Americans were victims of discrimination, they would not travel and this would hurt
interstate commerce); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922) (stating that stockyards
were in "the stream of commerce," since cattle and goods were only temporarily in
stockyards); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 194 (1824) (stating that "[c]ommerce among
the States" is "commerce which concerns more States than one").
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Congress.
In Gibbons v. Ogden,246 the Supreme Court first addressed this issue.
Ogden had an exclusive steamboat operating license from New York
state.247 Gibbons, who had a federal license to operate his vessel between
New York and New Jersey, was stopped by New York from entering New
York state waters because of Ogden's steamboat monopoly.24 Gibbons
brought suit, arguing that this was a violation of the Constitution and spe-
cifically the Commerce Clause.249 The Court found that New York's grant
of the monopoly was invalid since it interfered with interstate com-
merce.25 States, however, can regulate those parts of interstate commerce
which are local in nature and need different treatment from state to
state.
251
Under the holding in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,252 a two prong test is
used to determine if state regulation is unconstitutional.253 First, does the
regulation discriminate against interstate commerce?254 Second, are the
burdens on interstate commerce clearly excessive compared to the local
benefits of that particular state? 5 If the answer to both of these questions
is yes, then the state regulation is unconstitutional and therefore invalid. 6
Under Pike, it is necessary to determine if the state regulation is dis-
criminatory against people from other states or interstate commerce in gen-
eral. A regulation or law is facially discriminatory if it imposes restrictions
or penalties on out-of-state people and not in-state people. If a statute does
discriminate, then the statute is unconstitutional and the state interest does
not outweigh the burden on interstate commerce. In City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey,257 a New Jersey statute prohibiting out-of-state waste from
entry into state was held to be invalid.25 There was an obvious, legitimate
246 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
241 Id. at 2.
248 Id.
249 Id. at 3.
250 Id. at 221.
251 Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 298 (1851).
252 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
253 Id. at 142.
254.Id.
255 Id.
256 This modem approach enhances the conflict between what might be good for one
state and its citizens and what might be good for the nation as a whole. For example, in
Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935), a New York statute requiring a minimum milk
price was held to be unconstitutional since this amounted to economic protectionism
and would have a negative effect on the national economy. Id. This result was reached
despite the fact that the statute may have helped certain citizens of New York and the
New York state economy.
2157 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
258 Id. at 628.
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state interest in keeping waste out, and yet there was no need to discrimi-
nate and burden interstate commerce." 9 A state, in pursuing a legitimate
state interest, cannot use a discriminatory method to achieve that interest if
there are effective non-discriminatory procedures that can be used.26 If a
regulation is facially discriminatory, then there must be a legitimate state
interest that outweighs the discrimination on interstate commerce, and there
must be no alternative non-discriminatory means to achieve that state inter-
est.
261
A statute may be discriminatory in effect but not facially discriminato-
ry.2 62 This occurs when a state does not explicitly treat out-of-state people
differently, but in the practical aspects and application of the statute it puts a
greater burden on out-of-state people than in-state people. 263 Even if a
state statute or regulation is found to be non-discriminatory, it may violate
the dormant Commerce Clause if it puts too great a burden on interstate
commerce." Conversely, a state law can burden interstate commerce and
be upheld so long as it pertains to local matters and the burden on interstate
commerce is not too great.2 65
In evaluating a state-sanctioned monopoly over public information with-
in this framework, one must consider the following questions. First, is the
interest the state identifies in justifying the monopoly a legitimate state
interest? Second, is the burden on interstate commerce too great? The argu-
ment against the monopoly is stronger if it discriminates in favor of the in-
state entities on its face.
259 Id.
260 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 376 (1979). If there is an available, non-
discriminatory alternative that is not used, then the statute is unconstitutional. Id.
261 Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2287 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (even narrowed dormant Commerce Clause test would invalidate state law
that facially discriminates against interstate commerce).
262 There are some scholars and judges who do not believe in this balancing ap-
proach. They argue that if a statute is non-discriminatory on its face then the dormant
Commerce Clause does not apply. Gillian E. Metzger, Unburdening the Undue Burden
Standard, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2025, 2042 (1994) (explaining and criticizing balancing
approach in dormant Commerce Clause analysis),
263 See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 352-54
(1977).
264 West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 2217-18 (1994) (applying
test and finding that local interests did not justify burden imposed on commerce); see
also Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia,
J., concurring in judgment) (explaining dormant Commerce Clause balancing test is
"like judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy"); CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 95-96 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (criticizing use of balancing test in dormant Com-
merce Clause cases).
263 West Lynn Creamery, 114 S. Ct. at 2211.
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In the hypothetical, the public land records in electronic form could be
sold and used across state lines. It is virtually certain that this business is in
the realm of interstate commerce. The county is willing to sell to anyone,
whether they are in-state people or out-of-state, as long as they agree not to
sell or compete with the county.
The burden is significant. An out-of-state publisher buying this product
is unable to distribute these public records in electronic form for publication,
analysis, public policy comparisons, or academic research. The burden on
interstate commerce would be enormous if all county and public records
could only be bought from the county in which the records originated. There
does not appear to be a very strong state interest other than to perhaps raise
revenues. 
266
F. Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection
Substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution immunizes persons from deprivation of life, liberty, or
property except when the deprivation is justified by a legitimate state inter-
est.267 Equal protection analysis is similar.26' A state-established monop-
oly on electronic publishing adversely affects First Amendment interests,
which involve a fundamental right, and therefore should trigger strict scruti-
ny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment269 and
probably would trigger similar scrutiny under a substantive due process
doctrine.27 It would be difficult for a state or municipality to show how
an information monopoly is necessary to promote a legitimate state interest.
There is little authority for the proposition that making money is a legiti-
mate state interest. Thus, it is hard for states to justify interfering with pri-
vate entrepreneurial interests. It would also be difficult to justify information
monopolies on the grounds of ensuring an accurate flow of public informa-
tion, because the less restrictive trademark approach is available to protect
266 Generally, strong state interests involve the health, welfare, and safety of their
citizens. Electrolert Corp. v. Barry, 737 F.2d 110, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (local safety
interests accorded particular weight in dormant Commerce Clause analysis).
267 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113
S. Ct. 753, 777 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that
civil rights conspiracy claim could be evaluated under either substantive due process or
equal protection test).
268 But see Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.3 (1987)
(questioning whether equal protection and substantive due process standards are same in
property taking cases).
269 See Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 234 (1987) (find-
ing that state sales tax targeting general interest magazines, while exempting other pub-
lications, violated First Amendment rights).
270 See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
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any interest in avoiding errors in public information.
Thus, state monopolies on public information could be vulnerable to
attack under the Reconstruction era civil rights acts2" ' when they are estab-
lished at the state and local level, and to challenges as constitutional torts
when they are established at the federal level.
V. PERMISSIBLE INFORMATION POLICIES
The legal and policy constraints on information monopolies still leave
all levels of government with an enormous range of possibilities for dis-
seminating electronic information products. First, and most basically, there
is nothing in the foregoing analysis that prohibits charging for access to
public information. Virtually every major policy statement and access law
permits governmental entities to charge for the cost of providing access to
public information. 72 Just as agencies may charge for the cost of provid-
ing access to raw content, so also may they charge for access to value-added
features. However, the pricing for public, information is regulated. 3
Instead of trying to tease a more precise answer to the cost allocation
question out of the characteristics of a particular public information product
or information system, however, it is better simply to express a basic policy
position on whether full costs or only direct costs should be reflected in the
price for public information products. After doing this, it is best to then
focus on the competition inherent in the diversity principle as a practical
means of limiting the price that can be maintained for public information
from governmental sources. Theoretically, private disseminators of public
information will price at or close to marginal costs, and if a public source is
pricing much higher than marginal costs, consumers will buy from the pri-
vate sources instead of the public source, unless greater reliability and visi-
bility of the public source justifies a premium price in the minds of consum-
ers.
271 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988); id. § 1985(3).
272 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (agencies must promulgate
regulations establishing fees for filling FOIA requests); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 119.07(1)(a)
(West 1995) (establishing right to access upon payment of statutory fee); id. § 119.085
("The custodian shall charge a fee for remote electronic access, granted under a contrac-
tual arrangement with a user, which fee shall include the direct and indirect costs of
providing such access."); OMB Circular A-130, 58 Fed. Reg. 36,068 § 8(a)(7)(c) (1993)
("Set user charges for information dissemination products at a level sufficient to recover
the cost of dissemination but no higher.").
273 See infra part VI.
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VI. PRICING
Limiting copyright and quasi-copyright protection for public information,
as this Article advocates, raises questions about how public information can
be priced. Pricing arguments have to do with cost accounting: Whether
prices for public access to public information may reflect a portion of the
fixed costs of agency information systems, perhaps including systems de-
signed to collect public information.274 Most policy guidelines addressing
cost accounting say that only the direct costs of providing public access
should be recoverable.7 5
However, determining direct costs is not simple. Volumes of decisions
of public utility commissions address controversies over allocating fixed and
joint costs. 6 Automated information systems usually have a relatively
high proportion of fixed costs for capital goods-hardware, software, and
communications facilities-that produce a variety of output streams. When
one of these streams is public access, how much of the fixed and joint cost
should be allocated to that stream as opposed to others presents an essential-
ly indeterminate question.
The absence of copyright protection and other monopolies means that
any price will be subject to competitive pressure. Indeed, the pricing issue
for public information merges with the issue of how electronic information
can be priced whenever intellectual property protection is weak, as in
Internet environments where infringement is easy to commit and difficult to
detect.
Microeconomic theory explains that competition will force prices to a
274 See generally MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. and Telegraph Co.,
708 F.2d 1081, 1114 (7th Cir. 1982) (explaining controversy over use of marginal,
average variable or average total cost as the standard for measuring predatory pricing);
In re IMB Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 481 F. Supp. 965, 988 (N.D. Cal.
1979) (explaining marginal, average variable, and average fixed cost measures).
275 Compare OMB Circular A-130, 58 Fed. Reg. 36,068 § 8(a)(7)(c) (1993) ("Set
user charges for information dissemination products at a level sufficient to recover the
cost of dissemination but no higher. They shall exclude from calculation of the charges
costs associated with original collection and processing of the information.") with Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 119.0851 (West 1995) ("The custodian shall charge a fee for remote elec-
tronic access, granted under a contractual arrangement with a user, which fee shall in-
clude the direct and indirect costs of providing such access.").
276 See e.g., Colorado Office of Consumer Counsel v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 786
P.2d 1086, 1094 (Colo. 1990) (explaining controversy over joint cost allocation);
Knutson Towboat Co. v. Oregon Bd. of Maritime Pilots, 885 P.2d 746, 754-55 (Or.
App. 1994) (approving joint cost allocation); Robert A. Green, The Future of Source-
Based Taxation of the Income of Multinational Enterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 18, 86
n.91 (1993) (affirming well established principle of public utility regulation that allo-
cation of joint costs is essentially arbitrary).
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level close to marginal cost.277 The existence of high fixed costs increases
the challenge of staying in business because marginal cost pricing means
that fixed costs may not be covered.278 Conventional publishing has high
fixed costs compared to variable costs,279 but Internet architectures with
their easy duplication, cheap routing, and distributed production possibilities,
probably change this relationship between fixed and variable costs signifi-
cantly. Thus, the newer technologies for providing public access to public
information probably reduce the risk that marginal cost pricing will make it
impossible for nonsubsidized publishers to stay in business. In the past, mar-
ginal cost pricing by a public entity for an information product threatened
private sector disseminators because they would have had to meet the
agency's price to remain competitive, but such a price would not permit
them to cover their fixed costs. Technology required that any dissemination
include not only content but also added value, inseparably bundled together.
Now, with Internet architectures, it is feasible for agencies to make
available the raw content of public information, and marginal cost pricing
for that content reduces the costs of private sector redisseminators. As they
add value, they can increase their prices for the added value above what the
agency charges for the raw content. As long as the agency charges prices
for each of its own value-added elements that covers the marginal costs of
providing those elements, there is no unfair competition by the agency.
Competitive advantage is driven solely by efficiency in producing the value-
added elements.
There also is another kind of competitive risk-the one intellectual prop-
erty law addresses. Even when fixed costs are a relatively small part of total
cost, the original producer of a publication faces a threat of free riding when
a competitor can produce essentially the same product without incurring the
same fixed costs as the original publisher. For example, if the competitor
simply copies chunking and tagging and pointers value, the competitor has
the benefit of the originator's fixed investment without paying the cost
(assuming the cost of copying is less than the cost of creating the chunking
and tagging and pointers value in the first place).
The best pricing strategy to be sought by public policy is the following:
The agency should price at marginal cost for access to the basic content,
letting taxpayers pay the fixed costs of collecting and assembling this raw
content, as is usually the case, if collection and assembly of the raw content
is within the agency's statutory mandate. This presents no threat to private
277 EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 241 (2d ed.
1975) ("[A]t the equilibrium price, price will equal marginal cost for all firms that
choose to produce, rather than shut down their plants.").
278 Id. ("Price may be above or below average total cost, since there is no necessity
that profits be zero or that fixed costs be covered in the short run.").
279 Printing presses and binderies cost more money than the labor and paper to print
a significant press run.
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sector publishers because agencies have a natural monopoly over the raw
information.280 The policy preserves a role for private sector publishers not
only when agency activity is limited to relatively raw forms of the informa-
tion, but also when additional value-added features are paid for with public
money. What is essential is that all private sector competitors get the benefit
of the public investment at cost. As long as that is true, taxpayer subsidy of
agency activities will not pose a threat to private sector activity aimed at
adding value.
Any private sector entity that adds value can obtain access to the agen-
cy-produced baseline at the marginal cost to the agency and have her added-
value protected by intellectual property. Then, the only risks of free riding
are the risk of undetected or unpunished intellectual property infringement
and the risk of free riding on "sweat of the brow." Public policy can lower
the threat of that kind of free riding by making little "sweat of the brow"
necessary through systems like Internet distribution and GILS finding aids.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article argues that both government and private entrepreneurship
have a role to play in realizing the advantages of information technology
with respect to public information. It also argues, however, that governments
need to choose between engaging in proprietary activities in a genuinely
competitive environment and engaging in more limited public activities. If
governments wish to engage in the former and become value-added elec-
tronic publishers, they should do so in a competitive marketplace without
trying to extend inherently governmental monopolies into private markets.
If, on the other hand, governments want to act within the protections of
governmental privileges and immunities like the traditional monopolies over
public services, they should limit themselves to traditional maintenance and
release of relatively basic content, leaving the value adding activities to
others. In no event should governments establish or sanction monopolies
over public information.
280 This natural monopoly does not mean that private sector entities are prohibited
from collecting the information; it just means that it would not pay them to do so.
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